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and the Polish translation ofthe Abstract.Abstract: Following the predominance of macroeconomic stabilisation policies
and passive income support schemes in the first phase of transition, active labour
market policies (ALMPs) have now come to playa more important role in transition
economies. This paper looks at the Polish experience and provides empirical evi-
dence on the effectiveness of ALMPs. We use the Polish Labour Force Survey of
August 1994 in combination with its Supplement on the Evaluation ofLabour Mar-
ket Policies together with data on ALMP expenditure at the regional (voivodship)
level. The macroeconometric analysis of the relationship between labour market
flows and ALMP expenditure shows no significant effects. The microeconometric
analysis reveals that ALMPs are not particularly well targeted at the problem groups
in the labour market. That is, women and people with basic vocational education do
not receive enough attention, whereas persons formerly employed in the public
ad~inistration seem to have a privileged status in ALMPs. As to the effectiveness
of ALMPs, the paper shows that former participants cannot expect to find employ-
ment more easily than their peers who have been unemployed but have not been in a
programme. Subjective evaluations offormer participants also suggest that ALMPs,
but especially works programmes, have not increased their chances to find a job.
Streszczenie: Po okresie dominacji makroekonomicznej polityki stabilizacyjnej i
pasywnych programow ochrony dochodow w pierwszej fazie transformacji, akty-
wna polityka panstwa na rynku pracy zaczyna obecnie odgrywac coraz wazniejsz'l:
rolt( w krajach przechodz'l:cych transformacjt( gospodarcz'l:. Niniejszy artykul anali-
zuje doswiadczenia Polski i dostarcza empirycznych dowodow dotyczscych efek-
tywnosci aktywnej P9lityki panstwa na rynku pracy. W artykule wykorzystujemy
badania aktywnosci /ekonomicznej ludnosci przeprowadzone w Polsce w sierpniu
1994 w pol'l:czeniu z badaniem modulowym poswit(conym ocenie polityki panstwa
na rynku pracy, jak rowniez dane 0 wydatkach na aktywn'l: politykt( panstwa na
rynku pracy w przekroju regionalnym (wojewodzkim). Makroekonomiczna analiza
nie dowodzi istotniejszych zalernosci mit(dzy strumieniami sHy roboczej na rynku
pracy a wydatkami na aktywn'l: politykt( panstwa na rynku pracy. Analizy mikroe-
konometryczne pokazuj'l:, ze aktywne polityki panstwa na rynku pracy nie s'l: zbyt
dobrze adresowane do grup problemowych wystt(puj'l:cych na rynku pracy. Chodzi
o to, ze kobietom oraz osobom z wyksztalceniem zasadniczym zawodowym nie
poswit(ca sit( wystarczajscej ~wagi, podczas gdy osoby zatrudnione uprzednio w
administracji publicznej zdaj''l: sit( posiadac uprzywilejowany status w aktywnej
polityce panstwa na rynku pracy. Jesli chodzi 0 efektywnosc aktywnej polityki
panstwa na rynku pracy, artykul pokazuje ze wczesniejsi uczestnicy aktywnych
programow nie mog'l: spodziewac sit( latwiejszego znalezienia pracy niz ci, ktorzy
S'l: bezrobotnymi nie uczestnicz'l:cymi w aktywnych programach. Subiektywne
oceny wczesniejszych uczestnikow programow sugeruj(l rowniez, ze aktywne pro-
gramy przeciwdzialania bezrobociu, a zwlaszcza programy robot publicznych i prac
interwencyjnych nie zwit(kszaj(l ich szans znalezienia pracy.1 Introduction
As the e~perience with the persistence ofhigh unemployment in most GEeD coun-
tr~es has shown, macroeconomic policies and passive income support schemes are
not sufficient remedies against the unemployment problem. Since the 1980s, active
labour market policies (ALMPs) have been widely used in market economies to en-
hance the employability of particularly disadvantaged groups in the labour market.
This is attempted by either placing these groups into an employment relationship
(public works, subsidised employment), or by augmenting their human capital
through (re-)training, or sometimes by giving them loans so they can start their own
business. Thus governments try to promote allocative efficiency by overcoming
market failures such as incomplete information when unemployment gives a nega-
tive signal on employability to prospective employers or capital market restrictions
prevent the financing ofprivate investments in human capital. Apart from allocative
efficiency, ALMPs are also used to promote equity by redistributing job opportuni-
ties to the problem groups, which usually consist ofpeople with a low level ofedu-
cation, women, older workers, or the disabled.
The two aims of equity and allocative effiCiency are often in conflict with each
other: faced with a person who seems rather unemployable even after an ALMP, the
official in charge at the labour office concerned with allocative efficiency will
probably leave the person on the dole. Yet another official, who is more worried
about equity, may want to place the worker onto an ALMP scheme. Targeting effi-
ciency therefore requires information on the problem groups in the labour market,
the impac{of ALMPs on individual outcomes as well as the social preferences con-
cerning equity versus allocative efficiency. While the latter are to a large extent
politically determined, information on problem groups as well as on the effective-
ness ofALMPs can in principle be obtained from empirical studies.
In the empirical literature, the main microeconomic questions in this area are, first,
whether it is possible to target problem groupS effectively, second, whether partici-
pation in ALMPs increases an individuals employment probability in the short as
well as the long run, and third, whether there are any income effects. Yet although
ALMPs may be effective in placing some of the unemployed into jobs, subsidised
labour might replace non-subsidised labour. This negative replacement effect can
most easily be taken into account in macroeconomic studies, like those on labour
market flows at the regional level.
Most of applied research on the effectiveness of ALMPs in Central and Eastern
Europe so far has taken the macroeconometric augmented matching function ap-
proach on regional panel data (see Terrell and Lubyova, 1995; and Terrell and Mu-
nich, 1995, for short surveys). In these studies, some flow (e.g. exits from unem-
ployment or hirings) is regressed on vacancies, unemployment, and a set of vari-
ables measuring ALMPs (e.g. expenditure or the number ofparticipants). Burda andLubyova (1995) using this approach argue that for the Czech and Slovak Republics
public works and subsidised employment had a positive, but modest effect on exit
rates from unemployment. Similar results for the Czech Republic are found by
Boeri and Burda (1995) who take possible endogeneity of ALMPs into account in a
dynamic (partial adjustment) model. Svejnar, Terrell and Munich (1995) find posi-
tive effects for the Czech, but not for the Slovak Republic, which they ascribe to the
"different demand and geographical conditions in the two countries. Munich, Svejnar
and Terrell (1994) demonstrate the importance ofthe specification on the estimates.
For Poland, G6ra and Lehmann (1995), also using the augmented matching function
approach, find no significant effect of training on hirings. Lehmann (1995) also
concludes that training and public works have no effect on hirings, but that subsi-
dised employment has a positive one.
The microeconometric literature on the subject is not a terribly large one, although a
number ofstudies have been undertaken since the late 1980s (see OECD, 1993, for
a short survey). Studie-s on western countries show that the estimated effects of
ALMPs are sensitive to the econometric techniques employed. Sometimes no ef-
fects are found, sometimes the effects are significantly positive for employment op-
portunities and incomes, but they tend to be rather small (OECD, 1993). Pro-
grammes which are targeted at specific problem groups seem to be more effective
than ones which target a very general group, such as all unemployed in the extreme
case. For Eastern Germany, Steiner and Kraus (1995) find positive effects ofpublic
~work.s (ABM) for long-term unemployed males, but no such effects for females. As
to the targeting issue, the authors find that women are in effect not targeted accord-
ing to the formal criteria set down by the legislator: women with better chances to
find employment also have better chances getting onto a public works scheme.
Lechner (1995) looks into off-the-job training in Eastern Germany that began after
reunification, and which is subsidised by the Federal Labour Office. No positive
effects were found for the short run.
There is little microeconometric research yet on the Central and Eastern European
reform countries, but the existing evidence points to similar results as those for
western countries. Micklewright and Nagy (1994, 1995, 1996) estimate exits to
employment and into ALMP measures for Hungary. They identify older and less
educated people as problem groups. Howeyer, these groups are less likely to receive
public training. For subsidised employment, they also find no effective targeting.
On the other hand, the less eduGated seem to be targeted in public works. However,
O'Leary's (1994) results suggest a negative effect of public works on employabil-
ity, which might be due to a stigma effect. Training is found to be useful, though.
For Poland, G6ra and Lehmann (1995) present cross-tabulation evidence from the
Supplementary Labour Force Survey on the Evaluation of Labour Market Policies
of August 1994, the data set also used in the present study. They find that public
works and subsidised employment, although targeted mainly at the long-term un~
2employed, are not very effective due to high turnover rates. For public training, on
the other hand, positive effects on employability are found, but the real problem
groups do not seem to be targeted well. Kwiatkowski (1996) mainly concurs with
these results: he also concludes that problem groups are not effectively targeted and
that ALMPs are not particularly effective. However, Kwiatkowski argues that both
training and subsidised employment are far more effective than public works on the
micro level.
This paper explores the regional (voivodshipl) and the individual effects of ALMPs
in Poland. Poland was transformed into a market economy by way of a shock ther-
apy. So in relation to other countries in transition, the Polish labour market institu-
tions had to adjust themselves very rapidly. As a consequence ofthe shock therapy,
unemployment rose up to 14% within 2 years thus calling for policy action.
Whereas an unemployment benefit system was introduced right at the beginning of
transition in 1990, ALMPs were not important before 1992 but have gained in im-
portance since. From the pioneer experience of Poland, we also hope to learn
something on the effectiveness ofALMPs for other transition economies.
Our analysis of ALMPs is limited to public works, subsidised employment and
publicly-financed training. For comparative purposes, we also look at both self-
and employer-financed training in the microeconometric analysis. We investigate
the issue of targeting efficiency of ALMPs and the effects of ALMPs on employ-
ability also exploring the subjective evaluation ofthe schemes by their participants.
Due to data limitations, income effects are not considered here. For the micro-
econometric analysis, we use individual data from the August 1994 Polish Labour
Force Survey as well as its Supplement on the Evaiuation of Labour Market Poli-
cies. In the macroeconomic part, we use data from the first eleven waves of the
Polish Labour Force Survey together with expenditure data from the National La-
bour Office (NLO).
Section 2 gives a short institutional account of ALMPs in Poland. An impact
evaluation of ALMPs on regional labour market flows is undertaken in section 3,
while section 4 presents the microeconometric analysis ofALMPs. The paper con-
cludes with a discussion in section 5.
I Poland is administratively divided into 49 voivodships.
32 Active LabourMarket Policies in Poland
Figure 1 plots the development of the registered unemployment rate
2 and the share
of ALMP participants in the unemployment stock. ALMPs became significant not
before the end of 1992 when unemployment had already been over 10 percent ofthe
labour force for over a year. Although the share of ALMP participants amongst the
unemployed behaves cyclically, it seems on a rising trend. The reason for this cycli-
cal behaviour is the disbursement ofthe ALMP fund during the last quarter of each
year (G6ra and Lehmann, 1995) which leads to a large inflow into ALMPs in the
consecutive months.
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1-- Registered Unemployment Rate--Participants in ALMPs I Unemployed1
Note: Q denotes quarter, M denotes month. We only consider public works, intervention works
and public training.
Sources: GUS (1994) and GUS (1995). The GUS is the Central Statistical Office of Poland. See
also Witkowski (1995).
2 In the Polish Labour Force Survey, a person has to fulfil the three conditions of the International
Labour Office (ILO) for being classified as unemployed: (i) he or she must not work, (ii) he or
she must seekemployment and (iii) he orshe must be ready to start work in the reference week or
the following one (Szarkowski and Witkowski, 1994). The most important difference between
the ILO and the Polish local labour office (LLO) definition is that for the LLO, a person has to be
registered as unemployed as well (for more details see Steiner and Kwiatkowski, 1995; n.7). In
September 1994,45.2% ofthe registered unemployed received benefits (GUS, 1995).
4ALMPs comprise a variety ofpolicy measures which,range from direct job creation
to loans for people who are willing to start their own business. The DEeD (1993)
distinguishes between five programme categories which are listed together with
their Polish equivalents in Table 1. Although Poland has a similar range of ALMP
programmes as other market economies, there are - apart from the support of ap-
prenticeships - no special youth measures, nor are they planned (G6ra, 1994).
Table 1: Classification ofALMP Policies
OECD ALMP Category






Name ofCorresponding Polish Institution
Voivodship and Local Labour Offices
(VLOs and LLOs)





Sources: OECD (1993), p.41; and Kwiatkowski, Janusz and Steiner (1995).
An international comparison of unemployment as well as active and passive labour
market expenditures in Poland is presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Polish Labour Market Policies in Comparison 1992
Unemployment Expenditures on Expenditures on Policy
Rate Active Passive Activism
Measures Measures
[% ofGDP] [% ofGDP]
Poland 13.3 0.32 2.51 11.3
Czech Republic 3.2 0.32 0.19 62.7
Slovak Republic 12.1 1.37 0.65 67.8
Hungary 11.6 0.39 2.39 14.0
Spain 18.4 0.57 3.07 15.7
Sweden 5.3 3.21 2.78 53.6
United States 7.4 0.25 0.58 30.1
Notes: (1) Passive measures are essentially unemployment benefits.
(2) The index for policy activism equals the percentage share ofexpenditures on active measures in
total expenditures (active and passive).
Sources: Unemployment Rates for the Visegnid countries: Boeri (1994), p.30; for the OECD
countries: OECD Main Economic Indicators, June 1995, Paris; Expenditures: OECD (1993),
pp.73-78.
5In 1992, Poland was the least activist amongst both the OECD and the Visegnid
countries.
3 Policy activism is defined as the share of ALMP expenditure in total la-
bour market expenditure. The most activist OECD country is Sweden, where
ALMPs have a strong tradition. Polish labour market policy activism and expendi-
ture as a percentage of GDP was roughly at the level of Spain,.an OECD country
which also has a two-digit unemployment rate. Itshould be noted that even a liberal
country like the United States with much lower unemployment spent only a little bit
less of GDP on ALMPs than Poland. As can be seen from Figure 1 above, though,
ALMPs became more prominent in Poland after 1992.
Polish ALMPs are financed from the Labour Fund. Roughly one third ofthe fund is
raised from employers' contributions (3% of the product wage). The rest comes
from state budget transfers (G6ra, 1994). The Labour Fund finances both active and
passive labour market measures. The institutional and administrative structure re-
sponsible for the implementation ofALMPs in Poland is described in Figure 2.
The delivery mechanism for ALMPs is in fact quite decentralised like in other
transition countries with LLOs having in practice a lot of discretionary power over
the resources allocated to them (G6ra and Lehmann, 1995). On the one hand, such a
decentralised system is likely to perform better in face of the diverse regional de-
velopments during the transition to a market economy. Considering, on the other
hand, the lack of expertise of labour offices which had to establish ALMP pro-
grammes from scratch, more centralised decision making or at least monitoring and
education oflocal officials may be needed. For example, one reason for the alleged
initial bad performance of public training are probably failures in the delivery
mechanism. LLOs first had to go through a learning process and build up a network
oftraining providers (Boeri, 1995). Given that labour offices in transition countries
are also heavily understaffed (Boeri, 1995; World Bank, 1993), it seems no surprise
that many regulations are not well enforced. There is no evidence that Polish LLOs
use ALMPs as a work test, although an unemployed person may be eliminated from
the register in case ofrefusal to accept a placement in a public or intervention works
programme (G6ra and Lehmann, 1995). An important incentive to join ALMP
schemes is the fact that the eligibility for unemployment benefits is renewed after a
programme. Under the Polish flat-rate system, an unemployed person is usually
entitled to 12 months of benefits, which generally amount to 36% of the average
wage ofthe previous quarter. In December 1993, this would have been 86.1% ofthe
minimum wage (World Bank, 1994).
3 The Visegnid countries are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, ~d the Slovak Republic. Since
the end of 1995, the Czech Republic is a member ofthe OECD.
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Note: MLSP: Ministry ofLabour and Social Policy; NLO: National Labour Office; VLO: Voivod-
ship Labour Office; LLO: Local Labour Office.
Sources: G6ra (1994), p.203f.; Kwiatkowski, Janusz and Steiner (1995), p.28lff.
Our study will focus on works and training programmes. During the participation in
a training programme, which is supposed to take about 3 to 6 months, the unem-
ployed receive an allowance equal to 115% ofthe unemployment benefit. However,
failure to complete the training course on the part ofthe participant will result in his
or her having to repay the cost of training as well as losing his or her eligibility to
receive unemployment benefits (Kwiatkowski, 1996). Whilst in intervention works,
the participants receive a wage which is subsidised by the labour offices by an
amount equal to the unemployment benefit. Further, a premium is paid to the em-
ployer ifthe work contract is prolonged after 6 months, when intervention and pub-
lic works programmes usually finish. In the case of public works, the subsidy paid
by labour offices equals 75% of the average wage and is therefore about twice the
subsidy paid for intervention works (Kwiatkowski, 1996). Public works are organ-
ised by local governments and consist mainly of infrastructural investment such as
construction and municipal services. The type of work required in public works is
probably the reason why three-quarters of the participants in the years between
1990 and 1994 have been male. Intervention works comprise a greater variety of
industries and occupations and are organised by local labour offices. The gender
mix here is 60 to 40 in favour of males. Public training programmes, on the other
hand, are dominated by women who make up almost two thirds of the participants.
7Although labour offices initiate and organise the training courses, the training serv-
ices themselves are usually contracted out to private agencies. For more institutional
detail see G6ra (1994), Scarpetta and Reutersward (1994), Kwiatkowski, Janusz and
Steiner (1995), Gora and Lehmann (1995) and Kwiatkowski (1996).
Figure 3 depicts expenditure and participants' shares of the three ALMP schemes
.considered here from 1992 to 1994. The share of expenditure on training has been
decreasing, while public works have become more important. Expenditure per par-
ticipant in public works is high (as one would expect given the high subsidies) and
expenditure per participant in public training is low relative to expenditure per par-
ticipant in intervention works.













• public works Dintervention works I!Ipublic training
Source: National Labour Office; own calculations.
An issue often mentioned in the literature is the problem offinancial crowding out.
This means that regions with high uQemployment rates may have to spend so much
money on unemployment benefits that they have to reduce their expenditure on
ALMPs, which are more expensive and regarded as secondary. Ifthis was true, then
financial crowding out would induce a negative correlation between regional un-
employment rates and expenditure per unemployed person on ALMPs. The alterna-
tive interpretation of a negative correlation would be that expenditures on ALMPs
in fact reduce regional unemployment rates.






Note: The unemployment rates and expenditure data are averages over the years 1992 and 1993.
We take the logarithm of expenditure on public works, intervention works and public training
normalised by the number of unemployed for the corresponding voivodship in the Polish Labour
Force Survey. For the names ofthe voivodships see Figure Al in the appendix.
Sources: Unemployment data: Polish Labour Force Survey; expenditure data: National Labour
Office; own calculations.
As shown in Figure 4, though, voivodships with above-average unemployment
rates usually also spend above average on ALMPs per unemployed person (the
black-shaded regions) and vice versa (the white-shaded regions). There may there-
fore be a causal effect running from high unemployment rates to high expenditure
per unemployed on ALMPs. A statistical analysis of the impacts of ALMPs on un-
employment might be subj~ct to endogeneity bias through this reverse causation.
This point is taken up in the following section, where the effects ofALMP expendi-
tures on labour market flows are analysed.
3 Macroeconometric Impact Analysis
We use annual ALMP expenditure data provided by the National Labour Office
(NLO, Krajowy Urzad Pracy) for the years 1992 and 1993 to explore whether
ALMP expenditure has had any effect on labour market flows in 1993 and 1994,
respectively. We consider both effects on outflow rates from unemployment into
9employment and from employment into unemployment. In the latter case, we test
for replacement effects: although ALMPs may improve the employment probabili-
ties ofthe targeted group, firms might sack some oftheir previous employees to re-
place them with subsidised labour (Calmfors, 1994). In the case of unemployment
outflow rates, we test whether expenditures on ALMPs have any net effects thus
taking into account that, when applying for jobs, ALMP participants might displace
unemployed persons who have not been in a programme. Lagging the expenditure
variables hopefully mitigates the endogeneity problem mentioned in the previous
section.
4 But there are two other very ·important reasons for including lagged ex-
penditure only. First, if people in ALMPs are counted as employed, we will natu-
rally have a correlation between current ALMP expenditure and outflows from un-
employment, which will most likely not represent a causal effect. Second, the aver-
age duration of a works programme is about 6 months, and that of public training
about 2.5 months.
5 So some time will elapse until ALMP expenditure can have any
effect in.the labour market.
Corresponding to the definition of the outflow rates, we normalise voivodship
ALMP expenditure by the number ofunemployed and the number ofemployed, re-
spectively. The rationale of the normalisation of the expenditure variables in the
outflow from employment equation is that ALMP expenditure per employed person
measures the intensity ALMP expenditures jeopardise the incumbent worker's job
by pushing outsiders into the job market.
\
The outflow rates are calculated using Polish Labour Force Survey (PLFS) data.
6
The quarterly PLFS ofthe Central Statistical Office (GUS) ofPoland is a represen-
tative sample of the Polish population aged 15 and above (for details see Szark-
owski and Witkowski, 1994). Having been conducted as a pure panel in the first
four waves (until February 1993), the PLFS is now running on a rotating basis.
Each wave now consists of four subsamples which rotate according to the 2-(2)-2
rule (two waves in, two waves out, two waves in, exit). In our sample, we calculate
labour force exit rates between consecutive quarters of the four quarterly survey
dates within each year. Thus for each region (voivodship), we have exit rates for six
time periods for the years 1993 and 1994, which are assigned to the expenditure
data ofthe years 1992 and 1993, respectively, giving us a panel with 6 x 49 =294
observations. Table A1 in the appendix has ~ore detail on the sample.
4 Unfortunately, the endogeneity problem will persist to some extent ifexpectations of future un-
employment rates influence the labour offices' decisions on current ALMP expenditure, which is
not an unlikely assumption. ,
5 These averages are calculated from the Supplemetary Survey on the Evaluation ofLabOur Market
Policies.
6 The PLFS is conducted in February, May, August and November.
10Figures 5 and 6 show averages over time of outflow rates from unemployment into
employment plotted against lagged, logged and normalised ALMP expenditure by
voivodship. We cannot detect a relationship between ALMP expenditure and out-
flow rates from unemployment at first glance. The correlation coefficient for Figure
5 is -0.09.and insignificant. However, the plot ofemployment outflow rates against
ALMP expenditure in Figure 6 suggests replacement effects. Here the correlation
coefficient is significant and equals 0.57. The conclusions from these two plots
seem inconsistent. After all, if outflows from unemployment into jobs are unaf-
fected, who should displace workers?'
In the following, we explore the two relationships above econometrically. Tables 3
and 4 present estimates ofthe effects ofregional (voivodship) expenditure on pubVc
works, intervention works and public training on labour market flows using the
panel data set described above.
8 We estimate both fixed (FE) and random effects
(RE) models controlling for voivodship-specific effects. By including time dum-
mies, we-also control for time-specific effects. We also experimented with the in-
clusion of other explanatory variables describing the demographic and industrial
structure in the voivodships, such as age, education, occupation or industry group
shares. Since these variables have changed very little within the observation period,
their coefficients could not be estimated with precision in the fixed effects model.
We also encountered problems in the random effects specification....
7 It might be that replacement occurs through an increased absolute flow from unemployment into
employment. With a constant outflow rate, this can only occur ifthe unemployment pool grows
due to a larger flow from non-participation into unemployment.
8 All calculations in this paperare carried out using the statistical package STATA.
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Figure 6: PlotofEmployment-> Unemployment Flows against ALMP Expenditure







Note: The numbers in the scatter plot refer to the voivodship codes. The voivodship names and
codes can be found in Figure Al in the appendix. The plot depicts averages over time ofthe sam-
ple observations summarised in Table AI ofthe appendix.
Sources: Polish Labour Force Survey; National Labour Office, own calculations.
12Table 3: Estimates ofVoivodship Unemployment-> Employment Flows
Variable FE t RE t
In expo on public works per unemployed('_I) 0.0167 1.02 0.0049 0.59
In expo on intervention works per unemployed(H) --D.0208 --D.68 -0.0120 --D.88
In expo on public training per unemployed (H) 0.0213 1.10 0.0047 0.52
August 1992 --D.0339* -1.85 -0.0339* -1.85
November 1992 !(31Qs35 -2.92 -00535 l -2.92
May i993 -0.0064 --D.20 0.0189 0.88
August 1993 -0.0528 -1.64 --D.0275 -1.29
November 1993 ( ~.0869 1 -2.70 -0.0616 -2.88
constant &-.o.f~LJ 3.61 11~ _0.2317 J 8.08
R
2 overall 0.0648 0.0893
N - 49 49
T 6 6
# observations 294 294
F(.8. 231) ILM X
2
(!) test for voivodship effects 1.37* 0,1.84
Hausman specification test 1(2 8\ - 2.99
Table 4: EstimatesofVoivodship Employment-> Unemployment Flows
Variable FE t RE t
In expo on public works per employed('_I) --D.0003 --D.12 0.0014 1.02
In expo on intervention works per employed (I-I) 0.0060 1.32 0.0041* 1.85
In expo on public training peremployed (I_I) 0.0009 0.32 0.0027* 1.84
August 1992 , ....(] 0082 -3.02 -0.0082 I -3.02
November 1992 -0.0008 --D.30 -0.0008 --D.30
May 1993 -0.0081* -1.69 ~.01Q8 J -3.33
August 1993 , :{).0096-1 -2.01 -=D~OI23- 1 -3.79
November 1993 Ir..:o.0100'1 -2.10 ~.OI28 1 -3.93
constant 0.0115 1.24 00120 ] 2.53
R
2 overall '- 0.1293 0.1489
N 49 49
T 6 6
# observations 294 294
F(48. 231)I LM X
2
(1) test for voivodship effects r I.7C 7X
Hausman specification test 1(2(8 - 1.95
Notes: (I) Here, as In all other tables, shaded (astensked (*» coeffiCIents are slgmficant at the 5%
(10%) level.
(2) The R
2 overall is the squared correlation between the actual and the fitted N x T outflow rates.
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13 fUr Weltwirtschaft KielThe presence ofregional (voivodship) effects is tested by means of an F-test in the
fixed effects model and a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test in the random effects
model. The potential correlation of these effects with the regressors is tested by a
Hausman test. Ifthe Hausman X
2 statistic is (in)significant, then the (fixed) random
effects model is not appropriate and the (random) fixed effects model should be es-
timated.
According to the LM test statistic in Table 3, voivodship effects are not significant
at the 5% level. As the Hausman test shows, they also do not seem to be correlated
with the explanatory variables in the model. Hence, the random effects estimator
would also provide consistent, but more efficient estimates. The estimation results
show that none of the ALMP expenditure variables has a significant effect on out-
flow rates from unemployment into employment. The fixed effects model leads to
the same conclusion.
In contrast to the'scatter plot in Figure 6, Table 4 shows - at the 5% level - no sig-
nificant effects of ALMP expenditure on the outflow rate from employment into
unemployment. This is valid for both the fixed and the random effects model. How-
ever, the more efficient random effects estimates show that the coefficients on in-
tervention works and public training expenditure are significant at the 10% level.
The estimates imply that a 1% increase in the expenditure on intervention works
raises the outflow rate from employment into unemployment by 0.41 percentage
points, whereas the same increase in the expenditure on public training leads only to
an increase of 0.27 percentage points in the outflow rate. Thus, at the 10% signifi-
cance level, intervention works will have the highest replacement effects, followed
by public training. Public works, on the other hand, seem to have no significant re-
placement effects. Having found no significant impacts of ALMP expenditure on
the outflow rate from unemployment, it would be inconsistent, though, to interpret
our results as replacement effects. Hence, we have either misspecified our model or
we reject replacement effects at the 5% significance level. As to the former hy-
pothesis, we have used a variety of specifications. The models in Tables 3 and 4
have also been estimated using expenditures without normalising and/or taking
logarithms of the expenditure variables. In all these cases, we found no effects of
ALMP expenditure on labour market flows, ALMP expenditures mostly having no
significant effects on the outflow fr~m employment even at the 10% level. Further,
the significance of some regressors can result from a correlation between the error
term and the regressors in the random effects model, in which case it would be spu-
rious. Even though the Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis that there is
no such correlation, it still remains a possibility if the test has low power. In this
case, the fixed effects model would be appropriate, which shows no effects of
ALMP spending on employment outflows.
The conclusions we draw from our analysis so far are that none ofthe three ALMPs
under investigation seem to increase outflows from unemployment significantly. It
14may be the case, though, that the target groups for ALMPs are more employable
after ALMP participatjon, but they displace other unemployed people who would
have gotjobs had it not been for the competition with former ALMP participants. In
this case, ALMPs may still serve a purpose, as equity could be promoted by target-
ing disadvantaged groups in the labour market. However, to explore these issues, a
microeconometric investigation is called for, which we now tum to.
4 Microeconometric Targeting and Impact Analysis
Our microeconometric analysis combines information from the quarterly Polish La-
bour Force Survey (PLFS) with its Supplement on the Evaluation ofLabour Market
Policies, both carried out in August 1994. The PLFS provides us with information
on the labour force status and personal characteristics (e.g. age, education, occupa-
tion, household characteristics) of the interviewees. In the Supplementary Survey,
the interviewees are asked on changing their job, what they did a year ago, their
mobility~ participation in training courses, intervention and public works, start-up
loans, their experience with labour offices and some other relevant issues. Unfortu-
nately, the way the Supplementary Survey is set up, it does not provide sufficient
information for a proper econometric analysis which considers the pre- and post-
ALMP-participation labour market history ofthe interviewees. There is no question
asking former participants what they did after the programme. The rotating system
of the PLFS also does not allow us to trace back the complete employment history
of an interviewee. However, each participant states whether his or her participation
in the ALMP programme increased his or her chances offinding a regular job. Un-
fortunately, we have no idea whether we capture a short- or long-run effect in each
case.
In the following, we examine the targeting efficiency and effectiveness of the
ALMPs in Poland using microeconometric tools. We compare ALMPs with private
training, both self- and employer-financed. Due to the relatively small numbers of
observations in the separate categories, we combine both public and intervention
works in one single group which we will call 'works' hereafter. The Polish Labour
Force Survey puts us before an uncomfortable trade-off: we either have to exclude
persons who have never worked so far, or we cannot include occupation or industry
effects as persons without an employment history give no information on their oc-
cupational nor industrial background. We decided to exclude persons without em-
ployment history. Hence unemployed school Ieavers and any other new entrants
into the labour market are not included. Further, we only consider persons aged
between 18 and 55. As a consequence, our base sample for the next subsection is
reduced from 47,393 (survey size) to 32,331 individuals. Table A2 in the appendix
has more detail on the characteristics ofthe sample. We now turn to our first issue,
viz. the targeting efficiency ofALMPs.
154.1 The Equity Aspect ofTargeting Efficiency
In this subsection, we analyse whether groups with a high unemployment risk also
have a high chance of receiving support through ALMPs. This is one criterion for
targeting efficiency, yet more in the sense of equity. Subsection 4.2 will look into
targeting efficiency stressing the allocative efficiency aspect. First, we identify
problem groups in the labour market.
Table 5 presents estimates ofthe probability ofbeing in anyone ofthe three labour
force states employment, unemployment, and non-participation. We have excluded
persons who are currently in any of the ALMP or private programmes which re-
duces our sample to 31,822 persons.
For the purpose of providing a more intuitive interpretation of the estimation re-
sults, we define a reference person and calculate estimated effects of explanatory
variables on the probability ofbeing in anyone ofthe three labour force states rela-
tive to the reference person, who is a married male)ndustrial worker aged between
36 and 45. He has a basic vocational education, is employed in the public-sector
manufacturing or mining industry and lives in the countryside. For the reference
person, the average predicted probabilities of being in the labour force states are
83.48% for employment, 8.92% for unemployment and 7.60% for not participating.
It follows that the odds ratio for unemployment versus employment equals 0.1069
orroughly Ito 9.
To quantify the effect of explanatory variables we calculate relative Qdds ratios
(RORs), which are reported in the table. To give an example for the purpose of in-
terpretation, a relative odds ratio of 1.17 in the column 'Unemployed' for persons
aged between 18 and 25 means that
Preunemployed & 18 ~ age ~ 25)I Pr(employed & 18 ~ age ~ 25)
Pr(unemployed & 36 ~ age ~ 45)I Pr(employed & 36 ~ age ~ 45)
1.17.
Therefore, if a person with otherwise the same characteristics as the reference per-
son falls into the -age group 18 to 25, his odds for unemployment against employ-
ment will be 17% higher than ifhe was in th~ age group 36 to 45, and the odds ratio
would be 0.1251 or 1to 8.
Hence, ifthe relative odds ratio is greater (smaller) than 1, the chance ofbeing, say,
unemployed relative to employed (the reference labour force state) increases
(decreases) for persons in the category corresponding to the ROR.
9 Because our re-
gressors include interaction effects for young and single women, the relative odds
9 For the metric variable voivodship unemployment rate, the ROR corresponds to a one unit in-
crease (1 percentage point increase) in the voivodship unemployment rate.
16ratios of the affected categories cannot be read off directly from Table 5 and the
following tables. For this reason, Table A3 and the following tables in the appendix
present the relative odds ratios for these groups.
The estimation results in Table 5 show that the following groups have, ceteris pari-
bus, a high incidence ofunemployment:
- young persons
- women, especially those between 26 and 35 years ofage
- persons with primary or less education
- singles
- disabled persons
- persons doing simple jobs
- persons from the industries agriculture, forestry and fishing (as long as they are
not farmers);lO construction; trade, repairs; catering, and other services
ll as well
as
- persons living in towns with below 20,000 inhabitants.
From Table 5 we can also identify socio-economic groups with high non-
participation rates. These are
- the disabled,
- women, especially those between 26 and 35 years ofage,
- and persons aged between 46 and 55.
With the exception of persons between 46 and 55 years of age, who are subject to
the widely applied early retirement schemes, all these groups also have a high prob-
ability to be unemployed. For women, especially if aged between 26 and 35, the
reasons for not participating in the labour market are probably family responsibili-
ties. As these women know that they are comparatively unlikely to find jobs if they
search for ones, part ofthem may be discouraged from job search. The same line of
argument can be applied to the disabled.
10 People from the industries agriculture, forestry andfishing are mostly farmers by occupation,
farmers having an unemployment rate of only 2.1%. As a result, the unemployment rate in the
industry agriculture. forestry andfishing is also very low (4.6%). However, if we calculate the
unemployment rate in agriculture. forestry andfishing excluding farmers. we obtain an unem-
ployment rate of22.2% which is way above average and explains ourregression results.
II These include recreation, culture and sports.
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agriculture, forestry, fishing 5.68 3.78
electricity, gas, water -3.26 -2.24
construction 11.02 3.61
trade, repairs 2.92 -1.03
catering 4.10 1.29
transport, communication -3.00 -2.15
financial intermediation -3.60 -4.86
real es!ates, renting -0.22 -1.08
public administration 0.45 -2.55
education -0.85 -3.87
health, social work -4.92 -6.23
other services 2.78 -0.26
private sector 1.10 2.18 O. -5.71
place ofresidence (countryside)
100,000 inhabitants or more 0.33 1.13 2.31
20,000 to 99,999 2.13 1.03 0.60
19,999 or less 4.45 1.01 0.18




Notes: (l) Base categories are given in parentheses.
(2) The pseudo-R2McFaddCll is equl!! to l-ln(l)l1n(l,).where \n(l) is the log likelihood ofthe estimated
model and In(l,) denotes the log'likelihood of the model with all slope coefficients restricted to
zero.
Source: Polish Labour Force Survey, own calculations.
19Table 6: Multinomial LogitEstimates ofProgrammeParticipation
Variable Works Public Training Self-Financed Employer-Fin.
Training Training
ROR ROR ROR ROR
age between (36 and45)
18 and 25 1.59 3.11 1.27 1.07 2.56 8.48 1.05 0.57
26 and 35 1.36 1.98 1.31 1.11 4.70 1.45 4.84
(26 and 35) & female 1.15 0.63 1.27 0.79 0.87 0.67 -3.63
46 and 55 0.7 -2.01 0.26 -3.98 -3.49 0.59 -6.23
education (basic
vocational)
higher -2.48 3.04 2.87 8.87 6.22
post-secondary 2.74 2.10· 1.68 6.89 4.57
secondary vocational 1.42 2 0 4.01 5.67 4.26
secondary general 2.60 4.57 5.94 4.53 3.47
primary orless 2.39 1.63* 1.91 -1.45 --4.68
female -3.04 0.82 -0.86 --4.99 -5.93
female & single 0.57 1.66 1.47 3.05 3.37
single 1.49 0.90 -0.37 -om -2.56




manager -3.54 0.69 -0.89 1.37* 1.79 2.86
professional -3.32 0.42* -1.83 1. 2.79 6.16
technician -6.07 1.10 0.31 1.07 0.42 6.48
white-<:ollar -2.80 2.22 2.83 1.26 1.32 4.19
personal services -2.86" 1.34 0.91 0.87 --0.82 -1.50
farmer -2.32 0.84 --0.28 1.25 0.60 -5.70
simple blue~ollar -2.70 0.68 -1.00 1.21 1.15 -0.26
other simplejobs 5.55 1.24 0.74 0.93 -0.40 --4.21
(to be continued on the next page)
20Table 6: Multinomial Logit Estimates ofProgramme Participation (continued)
Variable Works Public Training Self-Financed Employer-Fin.
Training Training
ROR ROR ROR ROR
industry (manufacturing,
mining)
agriculture, forestry, 1.99 0.70 -0.63 0.61 -1.40 0.S7 -2.76
fishing
electricity, gas. water 0.65 1.70 I.ll 1.45 1.28 5.36
construction 2.77 1.51 1.53 1.33· 1.82 -4.26
trade. repairs 0.61 0.94 -0.22 4.37 -6.07
catering 0.98 0.20 -1.59 0.52 -2.67
transport, communication -1.44 0.57 -1.35 2.08 0.82
financial intermediation 6.12 0.88 -0.27 2.99 5.89
real estates. renting 6.76 1.06 0.11 3.31 -0.61
public administration 19.18 1.13 0.38 1.69 5.50
education 3.75 1.52 1.20 3.74 -2.90
health, social work 4.84 0.57 -1.41 3.29 0.45
other services 8.97 1.73· 1.85 3.33 -2.42
private sector 1.90 5.72 1. 9 3.24 2.24 1.55
place ofresidence
(countryside)
100,000 inhabitants or ·O.2~ -6.46 1.19 0.82 3.41 3.40
more
20,000 to 99.999 0.81 -1.50 1.86 3.04 2.16 1.07 0.86
19,999 orless "l~ 2 2.14 1.51· 1.74 1.11 0.82 0.98 -0.18
voivodship unemployment !. 1>- 1 ~ 8.95 4.79 0.99 -0.52 1.00 -0.55
rate
log likelihood .., -12,131.56
pseudo-R2MCFadden 0.15
# individuals 32,393
Notes: (1) see notes to Table 5.
(2) Recall that works comprise both public and intervention works.
Source: Polish Labour Force Survey, own calculations.
21Having established problem groups in the labour market we now take a look at Ta-
ble 6 where we present estimation results for the probability ofjoining an ALMP or
private training programme. The reference group consists of aJI persons who have
not been in an ALMP programme nor undertaken private training. If someone has
been in more than one programme, he or she is 'cloned' ,12 which leaves us with
32,393 observations. Bearing in mind the problem groups identified above, we ob-
,s_erve the following:
• The young members ofthe labour force are targeted effectively. It is worth notic-
ing that older persons are significantly more likely to receive private than public
training. It shows that the market has more confidence in this group than labour of-
fice officials. Indeed, there is heavy support in Poland for sending older people into
early retirement which is reflected in their high propensity not to participate (cf. the
relative odds ratio on age group 46to 55in Table 5).
• Women aged-between 26 and 35 are not targeted in works programmes, which
may have to do with the nature ofespecially the public works jobs. In case ofpublic
training we calculate a relative odds ratio of 1.52 (cf. Table A4 in the appendix),
which implies positive targeting. However, we also observe that women in general
are not targeted in either works or public training programmes, although there
seems some positive discrimination
13 by labour offices, because employers are very
unlikely to invest into female human capital due to the fact that females in this age
group are, on average, quite likely to temporarily withdraw from the labour force
for family reasons. Given that women make up about half the population, these re-
sults point to a lack ofconcern for one ofthe most important problem groups in the
labour market.
• People with primary or less education are not the ones with the highest chances of
joining ALMP programmes. Instead, for both works and public training schemes,
people with higher levels of education are preferred. Efficiency reasons probably
account for this fact, as private trainIng may be more effective for higher educated
people. Again, the important group of people with primary or less education (20%
sample share) is not,targeted according to equity principles.
12 To give an example, ifa person has been both in a works programme and in public training, we
take him or her into the sample as two people with the same characteristics, except that one of
them has only been in works and the other only in public training.
13 Positive discrimination here means that a person is given an advantage over the market outcome
by labour office officials.
22• Works programmes are - at the 10% significance level - more accessible to sin-
gles than married people, but public training is not (cf. Table A4 in the appendix).
So the evidence on equity is mixed.
• The disabled have extremely low chances ofgetting into an ALMP programme as
well as receiving private training. However, there are special measures for the dis-
abled in Poland (Kwiatkowski, 1996).
• The targeting of occupational groups is fairly equitable. Whereas works pro-
grammes are conceived more for workers In simple jobs, public training is mainly
aimed at 'improving the qualification of white-collar workers. The allocation ofthe
type of ALMP programme to occupational groups therefore seems to be driven by
efficiency aspects ifone takes the view that white-collar workers are more capable
to acquire new human capital through training. Indeed, the probability of receiving
employer-fmanced training for white-collar workers is amongst the highest of all
occupational groups.
• Except for people from the category other services, the industrial problem groups
are not the ones to receive special attention in ALMPs. The high probability of
public administrators getting into works programmes stands out. An explanation
could be that public administrators at labour offices when deciding whom to admit
to a works programme tend to sympathise with other (former) public administrators.
If that is the case, targeting would be very unfair. However, if we compare the
chances ofhigh unemployment groups to participate in self- or employer-financed
training courses, some positive discrimination by labour officials can be detected
for people from agriculture, forestry and fishing as well as construction workers
who - by the nature oftheir profession - can easily be integrated into public works
projects.
• Persons living in towns with less than 20,000 inhabitants receive more ALMP
support than persons from the big cities, which is consistent with equity. But one
has the best chance of receiving training in places between 20,000 and 100,000 in-
habitants.
• Voivodships with higher, unemployment rates tend to get more people into both
works and public training programmes. This is again evidence against financial
crowding out, as mentioned above in connection with Figure 4. We might have ex-
pected higher unemployment to positively influence self-financed training as em-
ployees seek to improve their qualifications to counteract the imminent danger of
job loss. Similarly, employer-financed training can be expected to be reduced in
face ofa growing pool ofunemployed, which offers a reserve army ofcheap labour
that employers can substitute for high-cost and highly qualified labour. Surpris-
ingly, the voivodship unemployment rate does not affect participation in private
training courses. An explanation might be market imperfections as suggested by the
23-insider-outsider and the efficiency wage theories. Another reason could be the fact
that many large employers - who can afford to finance training courses for their
employee's - do not plan their human resource expenditure on the voivodship, but a
more global level. Further, time and credit constraints may hinder employees from
improving their qualifications privately.
To sum up, for the largest part, other groups than the ones in need are targeted, al-
though some positive discrimination exists ifwe compare labour office support with
the market outcome. There-is"'considerable space for improvement concerning eq-
uity. However, equity may conflict with allocative efficiency. This latter aspect of
ALMPs will therefore be analysed in the next section.
4.2 The Allocative Aspect ofTargeting Efficiency
Former and current participants in the programmes are asked whether they think
their participation has improved their chances to find or keep employment. 14 They
had four options answering the question: no, I do not know, a little and very much.
Table 7: Did the Programme Improve Your Chances to FindorKeep Employment?
Answer
No




Works Public Training Self-Financed Empl.-Financed
Training Training
59.59% 29.29% 18.04% 18.54%
16.91% 7.07% 6.13% 6.74%
17.11% 52.02% 51.42% 52.3%
6.39% 11.62% 24.41% 22.43%
485 198 848 1,721
Note: The question is also answered by persons currently in the programmes. This is why we have
more observations here than in Table 9 below.
Source: Polish LabourForce Survey, own calculations.
Table 7 suggests that works programmes are of very little use for the participants.
This contrasts sharply with public and especially private training. Whereas almost a
quarter ofprivate training participants found their programme very useful, the ratio
is just over a tenth for public training and something more than a twentieth for
14 As people currently in ALMPs or private training programmes also answer the question, the
responses will be based on a wide range ofexperiences. A person who is currently in an ALMP
programme will perhaps have more difficulties judging its use than someone who has left a year
ago. On the other hand, the person may know quite well how much he or she can get out ofthe
ALMP scheme. Nevertheless, we checked that the inclusion ofpersons currently in programmes
does not affect our results to a qualitative extent.
24works. However, almost two thirds ofall respondents think that public training pro-
grammes have improved their chances to find or keep employment at least a little.
To see whether we can identify certain groups who found any of the programmes
especially useful, the structure of these answers was analysed by way of Ordered
Probit Models. Yet this led to the problem ofvery few or no observations in several
cells ofthe dependent variable cross-elassified by certain explanatory variables. As
a result, certain coefficients could not be estimated at all. Hence, we have grouped
the answers into two categories: a little and very much on the one hand and no and I
do not know on the other. Due to the paucity of observations for works and public
training programmes, we generally restricted coefficients with t-values smaller than
I in absolute value in the first-round estimation to zero.
The second-round estimation results for the probit models are presented in Table 8.
The higher a coefficient, the more valuable the corresponding group views the pro-
gramme-in question. By establishing a set of groups who get very much or very lit-
tle out ofthe programmes we can - similarly to subsection 4.1 - get further insights
into the efficiency of targeting, yet this time in the sense of allocative effiCiency.
However, as the pseud()-R
2s according to Veall and Zimmermann (1992) show, the
predictive power of all four regressions is very weak. IS This suggests that the suc-
cess of these programmes is predominantly determined by unobserved factors,
which may for example include the type of training, the training agency, the moti-
vation ofthe trainee etc. Hence we can evaluate the allocative efficiency ofthe four
programme types only to a rather limited e~tent. The results can briefly be summa-
rised as follows:
• Works programmes are found especially helpful by very young people, people
with post-secondary, secondary-general (significant at the 10% level), and primary
or less education, women, particularly if they are singles, and people in big cities
(significant at the 10% level) and large towns. They are found without much use by
the disabled, people in personal services, farming and simplejobs. In addition, all of
the few people in the industries electricity, gas, water; catering; transport and com-
munication consider their participation in works programmes more or less useless.
It follows in connection with the estimates of Tables 5 and 6 that both equity and
allocative efficiency could,be promoted by letting more women, especially singles,
into works programmes. In the case of people with simple jobs, there is a conflict
between allocative efficiency and equity.
IS The pseud(}-R
2
Veall-Zimmermann was found to come closest to the underlying OLS-R
2 in a Monte
Carlo Study on a binary probit model by VeaH and Zimmermann (1992).
25TableS: Probit Estimates ofSubjective Programme Evaluation
Variable Works Public Training S.-F. Training E.-F. Training
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
age between (36 and45)
18 and 25 O.~ 2.11 0.56* 1.82 0.17 1.46
26 and 35 0.24 1.30 0.37 1.12 0.08 1.02
(26 and 35) & female -0.11 -0.25




post-secondary 0.8 2.06 -3.20 0.26 1.50
secondary vocational -2.49 0.08 0.82
secondary general 0.4S* 1.72 -2.24 0.30 2.02
primary orless 0.37 2.07 -2.75 .4 -2.53
female 0.28 1.48 1.99 -0.01 -0.12
female & single 080 2.40 -0.84* -1.64 0.26 1.46
single -0.14 -0.62 0.34 0.81 0.03 0.24






technician 1.14 0.23 1.50 2.16
personal services 3.33 0.37 1.24
fanner 2.27 1.07* 1.85 0.47 1.28
simple blue-collar 0.78 1.47 0.27 1.42
other simplejobs 2.77 0.28 1.21
(to be continued on the next page)
26TableS: ProbitEstimates ofSubjective Programme Evaluation (continued)
Variable Works Public Training S.-F. Training E.-F. Training
industry (see note (2»
electricity, gas, water pred. perfectly
catering pred. perfectly pred. perfectly
transport, communication pred. perfectly
financial intermediation 0.62*
real estates, renting -0.67 -1.46 0.58*
public administration 1.27 2.33 0.44*
education 0.5




































voivodship unemployment -0.02 -1.50
rate
























Notes: (I) The base categories'are those given in parentheses plus the categories for which no co-
efficients are reported in the corresponding column.
(2) The base category here is manufacturing and mining; agriculture, forestry and fishing; con-
struction; trade and repairs, plus the categories for which no coefficients are reported.
(3) 'pred. perfectly' stands for 'predicts outcome perfectly', so that individuals in the correspond-
ing categories had to be excluded from the sample. In all these cases, except for the one person in
public training from the catering industry, the corresponding groups assess ALMPs not to be use-
ful. We have first estimated the models with all variables and then excluded the ones with t-values
smaller than I in absolute value. The full models with all the variables are available on request.
Source: Polish LabourForce Survey, own calculations.
27Of all occupational groups, those with simple jobs have the highest incidence of
unemployment (cf. Table 5). The fact that they are also most likely to get onto a
works scheme (cf. Table 6) can therefore be justified on equity grounds. However,
as mentioned above, Table 8 shows that targeting people with simple jobs is not al-
locatively efficient. The same conflict arises for persons living in small towns (less
than 20,000 inhabitants). Again, targeting is equitable with respect to this group, but
not allocatively efficient. It should be mentioned, though, that targeting is efficient
with respect to age as well as educational attainments. In the case of education, la-
bour officials target mainly on allocative efficiency rather than equity grounds.
• As to public training, young people (significant at the 10% level), people with
higher and basic vocational education, women, farmers, and people from the public
administration seem to get most out of it. By contrast, people in the other educa-
tional categories, especially those with post-secondary education, find public
training comparatively unhelpful. Comparing these results with the chances of
joining public traIning (cj. Table 6), we find that the evidence on the allocative ef-
ficiency oftargeting is mixed. Especially women and people with a basic vocational
education should receive more support through public training courses on allocative
efficiency (as well as equity) grounds. The same may be claimed for farmers, be-
cause, although they have a very low unemployment rate, most ofthem are likely to
be heavily underemployed. G6ra and Lehmann's (1995) conclusion that targeting is
allocatively inefficient in public training programmes can therefore only be partially
;'substantiated. However, as women and people with basic vocational education
make up large shares of the unemployment population (47% and 43% of the for-
merly unemployed, respectively), we would attach a comparatively large weight to
the inefficiency concerning these groups.
• Itis striking that only very few coefficients are significant in the column for self-
financed training, although the sample size is reasonable. The reason may be that
self-financed training is very heterogeneous including both minor further education
as well as complete re-qualification: whereas the share of people who have taken
part in an employer-financed training course for more than half a year is only about
10% percent, this share is approximately 25% in the case of self-financed training.
Unfortunately, though, our data does not allow us to distinguish further between
different types ofself-financed training. Itis shown that people with primary or less
education as well as people from the big cities (significantat the 10% level) do not
gain much from self-financed training. On the other hand, people in the industry
groups education and other services, which include recreational, cultural and sport-
ing activities, as well as - significant at the 10% level - financial intermediation,
real estates, renting and public administration are more likely to find their self-
financed training course useful than people from other industries. As a comparison
with Table 6 shows, private agents on the whole seem to invest efficiently, except
for persons from the big cities.
28• Employer-financed training seems to be fairly successful amongst people with
secondary general education, singles (significant at the 10% level), managers, pro-
fessionals, technicians and people from the private sector. People from the educa-
tion, health and social work industries generally do not think that employer-
financed training increases their chances ofkeeping their jobs or finding a new one.
It is worth noticing that people with a very high level of education have the best
chances ofreceiving employer-financed training, but our results show that they are
not the group who benefit most. However, it should be borne in mind that due to the
very low unemployment incidence amongst people with higher education, the fact
that the survey asks on the effects of training on finding or keeping employment
means that other positive effects, most notably productivity and income effects, are
not considered here. So targeting by employers may still be allocatively efficient,
but in this case, success will not be measured by the likelihood ofkeeping employ-
ment, as it can be taken for granted that employers will keep on their employees
when th~y spend money on their further education. Bearing this in mind the evi-
dence on employer-financed training gives credence to the view that the market is
efficient.
To conclude the discussion on the allocative efficiency of ALMPs, it can be said
that, compared to private agents, the targeting by labour officials is less efficient.
This need not be a generally negative result. Indeed, in the case of people with
simple jobs and people ill small towns, we find that for works programmes equity
stays in conflict with allocative efficiency, but that equity is seen as more important
by labour office officials. This is consistent with overall targeting efficiency given a
corresponding normative decision taken by policy makers. Nevertheless, in the case
of women in works programmes and women and people with a basic vocational
education in public training, we conclude that more support for these socio-
economic groups would improve both equity and allocative efficiency.
In this section, we have taken only a partial view of allocative efficiency based on
the subjective evaluations of the participants. In the following subsection, we are
looking at the more objective criterion of the employment effects of the various
programmes.
4.3 The Impact ofALMPs on the Labour Force State
As the currently existing data sets do not contain information on the pre- and post-
ALMP-participation labour market histories of the interviewees, we compare the
labour force state of formerly unemployed former programme participants in
August 1994 with the labour force state of the formerly unemployed who have
never participated in an ALMP programme. This is thus a first step towards an ob-
jective exploration ofthe impact ofALMPs.
29Table 9 shows that almost two thirds of former participants in works programmes
have been unemployed in August 1994. Former public training participants are also
more likely to be unemployed than the average person in the sample, but the differ-
ence is by far not as pronounced as for former participants in works schemes.
Table 9: Distribution of Labour Force States of Former Programme Participants Who
Have Been Unemployed Before (in percent)
Labour Force State Works Public Self-Fin. Empl.-Fin. Total Sample
Training Training Training
Employed 33.62 61.9 77.66 87.06 67.13
Unemployed 59.57 29.52 17.02 10.95 22.29
Not Participating 6.81 8.57 5.32 1.99 10.59
# individuals 235 105 188 201 5,007
Note: The sample consists of5,007 people who have been unemployed before and are currently not
in any ofthe four progr~es. The labour force state is the one dUring the reference week of the
August 1994 survey.
Source: Polish Labour Force Survey, own calculations.
Converse results hold for former participants ofprivate training schemes who have
very low unemployment rates. Especially persons having undergone employer-
financed training are very employable.16. However, the above correlations between
employment states and programme participation will be spurious if there are other
factors which influence both the labour force state and programme participation.
Therefore, we estimate the determinants of individual labour force states by a
multinomiallogit model in Table 10. We control for the same set of demographic
and socio-economic characteristics as in previous estimations (cj. Table 5). Yet
this time, our sample is limited to the 5,007 people who are currently not in an
ALMP or private training scheme and who have been unemployed before. As can
be seen from the estimates, persons who have previously been unemployed and are
aged between 46 and 55, female, disabled, or from the industry agriculture, forestry,
and fishing have a high probability to retreat into non-participation which supports
the 'discouraged worker' hypothesis mentioned in subsection 4.1.
In addition to the standard set of demogdphic and socio-economic characteristics,
we include four dummy variables for participation in any of the above-mentioned
programmes.
17 The base category refers to a person who has participated in none of
these programmes. Hence, in contrast to section 4.2 above, we compare the labour
16 Note that only 201 of 1,721 people who receiv(ed) employer-fmanced training were unem-
ployed before. The corresponding figures for self-financed training are 188 to 848.
17 It is possible that a person has taken part in more than one programme.
30market opportunities of former ALMP participants with those of formerly unem-
ployed persons who have never been in an ALMP programme. Table 10 shows that
after controlling for various demographic and soci~conomic characteristics, hav-
ing participated in a works programme increases the probability of being unem-
ployed almost sixfold, but has no effects upon non-participation. No significant ef-
fects are found for public training or self-financed training. However, former par-
ticipants ofemployer-financed training are ceteris paribus less than halfas likely to
be unemployed and about 80% less likely not to participate in the labour market
than their peers who have not received training paid by their employer.
One problem with the interpretation of the effects ofthese dummy variables is that
they are potentially endogenous. In particular, participation may be the result of
self-selection or the outcome of the selection rules used by firms or the labour of-
fices. That is to say, people who are not employable may have a high chance ofget-
ting into a works programme. Similarly, people who are very employable are likely
to have a good chance of receiving employer-financed training. In any case, the
dummies accounting for programme participation may be correlated with unob-
served factors determining an individual's labour force state. Hence, we believe it is
unlikely that the observed coefficients represent causal effects. As a consequence,
we experimented with instrumental variable estimation ofthe model shown in Table
10. However, due to the poor predictive power ofour equations for programme par-
ticipation, our results produced extremely large standard errors of estimated coeffi-
cients and turned out as inconclusive.
In sum, we cannot detect any positive effects ofALMPs on employment prospects.
Only works programmes significantly influence employment chances in our model,
but the effect is negative. This may be explained by a stigmatising effect ofALMPs
with a negative signal on a person's employability. On the other hand, it can also be
the result ofselection effects.
31Table 10: Multinomial Logit Estimates ofthe Labour Force State
Variable Unemployed Not Participating
ROR t ROR t
age between (36 and45)
18 and 25 -0.69 -3.56 148 J 2.55
26 and 35' 0.98 -0.16 1.40 1.53
(26 and 35) & female 1.05 0.30 1.00 -0.01
46 and 55 1.25 1.60 2.50 5.11
education (basic vocational)
higher 042 -2.96 0.48* -1.78
post-secondary 0.71 -1.44 0.59 -1.53
c
secondary vocational 0.83* -1.73 0.86 -0.99
secondary general 0.95 -0.30 1.15 0.68
primary orless 1.32 I 2.75 1.30 2.07
r,...-
female 1.63 l 4.10 _6.79 10.67
female & single 1~3 -2.84 0.18 -6.46
single 1.63 l 4.38 1.58 2.37
assigned to a disability group 0.93 -0.32 16.88 16.63
occupation (industrial worker)
manager 0.64* -1.78 0.59 -1.37
professional 20.45 ] -2.66 0.46* -1.81
technician .__Q~-] -2.70 0.59 1 -2.04
white~ollar 1.02 0.13 1.02 0.08
personal services 0.82 -1.24 0.82 -0.90
farmer O~olr 1 -7.85 0.09' I --6.13
simple blue-collar 0.98 -0.14 0.82 -0.84
other simplejobs . 0.93 -0.59 0.90 -0.60
(to be conunued on the next page)
32Table 10: Multinomial Logit Estimates ofthe Labour Force State (continued)
Variable Unemployed Not Participating
ROR t ROR t
industry (manufacturing, mining)
agriculture, forestry, fishing 1.58* 1.92 2.51 2.97
electricity, gas, water 0.77 -0.70 1.99 1.63
construction 1~-1.70 4.27 1.23 0.94
trade, repairs 1.30* 1.89 1.24 1.02
catering 1.11 0.41 1.51 1.36
transport, communication 0.93 -0.36 1.55 1.56
financial intermediation 0.54 -1.63 0.71 -0.71
real estates, renting 0.78 -0.76 2.05 1.95
-.
public administration 0.96 -0.22 0.87 -0.45
education I~ r~ 2.02 0.73 -0.92
health, social work 0.70 -1.64 0.77 -0.97
other services 1.20 1.09 0.87 -0.54
private sector Ir~ '0.66-':' -6.27 I 0.58 J -4.72
place ofresidence (countryside)
100,000 inhabitants or more 1.01 0.08 1.15 0.98
20,000 to 99,999 1.03 0.25 0.76* -1.74
19,999 or less 1.22* 1.83 1.18 1.02
I:"" voivodship unemployment rate 1.04 ] 3.83 1.03 , 2.24
works
I--;-r 10.65 1.54 1.43 I;" 5;75
public training 1.40 1.39 0.90 -0.25
self-financed training 0.80 -1.09 0.61 -1.41






Notes: see Table 5.
Source: Polish Labour Force Survey, own calculations.
335 Discussion
The results from both our macroeconometric impact and microeconometric evalua-
tion analyses overall cast doubt on the usefulness ofALMPs in the Polish transition
process. If we concur with the view that governments should keep their hands off
the economy unless it is shown they can do better than the market, we may conclude
that the best policy action would be to abolish ALMPs altogether. Some caveats
should be borne in mind, though.
(i) Although we have found no impact of lagged ALMP expenditure on regional
(voivodship) labour market flows, it is important to notice that we have used annual
expenditure data, but do not know the lag structure between the disbursement ofthe
funds and the implementation ofthe ALMP programmes.
(ii) The microeconometric analysis suggests that ALMPs are very often not effi-
ciently targeted.-Vested interests, for example, seem to give persons from the public
administration good access to works schemes, although these persons do not have a
high incidence of unemployment nor -do they particularly benefit from works pro-
grammes in terms ofbetter future labour market prospects. Also, women and people
with basic vocational education should receive more support on both equity and al-
locative efficiency grounds. Looking at occupational and place-of-residence
groups, we find conflicts between equity and allocative efficiency. However, we
could not establish any positive effects ofALMPs on individual future employment
prospects. In general, the estimated effects are subject to the problem of selectivity
casting doubts on the possibility ofidentifying causal effects from the currently ex-
isting data on Polish ALMPs.
(iii) ALMPs may have positive effects on the incomes of those who have partici-
pated and found a job, although re-employment chances may be unaltered. In other
words, ALMPs may cure poverty in employment even if they do not alleviate pov-
erty through lack ofemployment. This issue is not investigated here. Further issues
not discussed are the psychological and sociological effects ofALMPs. Participants
might see a new perspective for their lives through an ALMP programme. Crime
rates may be lowered. Hence ALMPs have the potential to deliver utility in different
spheres from the ones explored in tl,lis paper.
(iv) Yet in spite of all the caveats, the fact that ALMPs are held in low regard by
former participants gives credence to our tentative results. A reason for the sup-
posed ineffectiveness ofALMPs may be inappropriate targeting as found in our mi-
croeconometric analysis. Therefore, further research on the development and emer-
gence of problem groups in the labour market may help to make ALMPs more fo-
cused. Thus targeting efficiency can be improved, which shall in return make
ALMPs more effective.
34(v) It is difficult to generalise the results from our study to other transition econo-
mies, since delivery mechanisms, which may be of great importance for the effec-
tiveness ofALMPs as well as the situation on the labour market, differ substantially
between various transition countries. In order to draw more general conclusions on
the effectiveness of ALMPs in transition economies, more especially microecono-
metric research would be needed. However, this requires better data on labour mar-
ket transitions between ALMPs and the various labour force states, as well as in-
comes before and after ALMP participation.
35(This page has deliberately been left blank.)
36Appendix
Table At: Summary Statistics ofthe Macro-Sample
Quarters Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Outflow Rate Unemployment-> Employment (in percent)
Feb 1993 - May 1993 22.02 11.52 0.00 61.54
May 1993 - Aug 1993 18.64 9.56 0.00 52.63
Aug 1993-Nov 1993 16.67 9.21 0.00 50.00
Feb 1994 - May 1994 24.19 9.16 9.43 50.00
May 1994 - Aug 1994 19.55 7.57 0.00 33.33
Aug 1994 - Nov 1994 16.15 8.26 0.00 37.50
Outflow Rate Employment-> Unemployment (in percent)
Feb 1993 - May 1993 2.64 2.14 0.00 11.11
May 1993 - Aug 1993 1.82 1.31 0.00 5.41
Aug 1993 - Nov 1993 2.55 1.53 0.00 6.85
Feb 1994 - May 1994 2.27 1.23 0.00 5.51
May 1994 - Aug 1994 2.12 1.28 0.00 5.19
Aug 1994 - Nov 1994 2.08 1.35 0.00 4.91
Expenditure on Public Works
1992 3,553 2,839 68 11,335
1993 24,426 15,631 5,071 63,761
Expenditure on Intervention Works
1992 9,567 4,816 1,989 21,929
1993 27,397 16,091 7,105 74,539
Expenditure on Public Training
1992 3,939 3,987 212 21,243
1993 9,163 9,826 541 50,819
Note: The data is on voivodship level. The unit for the expenditure data is current million old Pol-
ish Zlotys (PLZ '000,000).
Source: Outflow Rates: Polish Labour Force Survey, own calculations; Expenditures: National
Labour Office.
37Figure At: The Voivodships ofPoland - Map, Codes and Names
Map
Note: The voivodship codes are the standard codes used by the Polish Central Statistical Office
(GUS).
38Codes and Names
Code Name Code Name
1 Stoleczne Warszawskie 51 Olsztynskie
3 Bialskopodlaskie 53 Opolskie
5 Bialostockie 55 Ostroleckie
7 Bielskie 57 Pilskie
9 Bydgoskie 59 Piotrkowskie
II Chelmskie 61 Plockie
13 Ciechanowskie 63 Poznanskie
15 Czestochowskie 65 Przemyskie
17 Elblaskie 67 Radomskie
19 Gdanskie 69 Rzeszowskie
21 Gorzowskie 71 Siedleckie
23 Jeleniogorskie 73 Sieradzkie
25 Kaliskie 75 Skiemiewickie
27 Katowickie 77 Slupskie
29 Kieleckie 79 Suwalskie
31 Koninskie 81 Szczecinskie
33 Koszalinskie 83 Tamobrzeskie
35 Krakowskie 85 Tamowskie
37 Krosnienskie 87 Torunskie
39 Legnickie 89 Walbrzyskie
41 Leszczynskie 91 Wloclawskie
43 Lubelskie 93 Wroclawskie
45 Lornzynskie 95 Zamojskie
47 Lodzkie 97 Zielonogorskie
49 Nowosadeckie - -
A2: Remarkon the Micr~ample
The number of individuals who are in both the Polish Labour Force Survey of
August 1994 and its Supplement on the Evaluation of Labour Market Policies is
47,393. Limiting the sample to persons between inclusively 18 and 55 years of age
we have 35,406 observations left. We then only include persons who give informa-
tion on their occupational and industrial background, which means they must have
been employed at some stage in their lives. This leaves us with 32,331 interviewees.
The distribution of these individuals across the different programmes and in the to-
tal sample by various characteristics is given together with the unemployment rates
in Table A2.
39Table A2: Micr<~-Sample Means (% Shares) and Unemployment Rates (%) for Subgroups
Variable Works Public Self-Fin. E.-Fin. Total Total
Training Training Training Sample Sample
~ean ~ean ~ean ~ean Mean DR
age between
18 and 25 9.09 4.96 9.76 -1.93 15.24 14.66
26 and 35 4.66 12.08 10.82 8.92 28.33 13.68
(26 and 35) & female -0.59 10.75 5.93 0.36 14.00 16.97
36 and 45 -3.49 -0.69 -8.98 2.32 35.04 10.87
46 and 55 -10.26 -16.34 -11.61 -9.31 21.39 7.95
education
higher -8.33 -1.17 18.15 13.69 8.74 3.64
secondary general 0.28 0.31 5.03 3.05 3.22 8.23
post-secondary -5.02 10.77 4.84 10.12 23.58 10.16
post-secondary 0.01 12.39 1.46 2.09 6.80 11.71
basic vocational 1.31 -14.29 -13.96 -11.60 36.01 13.95
primary orless 11.75 -8.01 -15.52 -17.35 21.65 14.30
female -11.27 9.56 -0.86 -5.99 50.03 13.21
female & single -0.58 6.1 6.21 -9.95 10.06 13.42
single 8.47 4.13 7.73 -21.43 21.63 15.33
assigned to a disability -8.28 -7.31 -8.34 -8.48 10.34 17.06
group
occupation
manager -4.67 -0.95 4.41 3.05 5.49 5.94
professional -6.36 -2.96 16.87 11.69 8.01 3.94
technician -4.77 3.28 2.07 13.62 11.37 7.57
white collar -0.66 13.45 1.70 3.61 7.26 15.41
personal services -3.30 4.84 0~06 -5.67 10.32 20.35
farmer. -8.44 -10.91 -10.50 -14.46 15.45 2.07
industrial worker 1.18 -2.33 -7.56 -3.30 22.53 16.34
simple blue-collar -4.03 -4.23 -1.58 -0.75 8.77 13.44
other simplejobs 31.06 -0.19 -5.49 -7.77 10.79 21.37
(to be continued on the next page)
40Table A2: Micro-Sample Means (% Shares) and Unemployment Rates (%) for Subgroups
(continued)
Variable Works Public Self-Fin. E.-Fin. Total Total
Training Training Training Sample Sample
~ean ~ean ~ean ~ean Mean OR
industry
agriculture, forestry, -8.04 -12.08 -12.48 -15.53 18.14 4.57
fishing
industry -13.99 -1.25 -10.32 1.10 28.01 14.13
electricity, gas, water -0.79 0.91 0.04 2.69 1.61 6.17
construction 0.90 3.25 -0.28 -1.83 7.35 22.10
trade, repairs -7.98 6.27 ,5.94 -5.26 12.93 16.93
catering. -0.19 -1.13 -0.34 -1.06 1.64 25.96
transport, communication -4.75 -2.04 0.20 1.86 5.57 9.37
financial intermediation 0.70 0.75 1.41 3.74 1.78 6.10
real estates, renting 1.83 0.34 1.50 0.53 1.68 10.49
public administration 28.65 1.81 0.67 8.55 4.75 9.19
education -2.25 0.90 8.69 2.37 6.17 7.93
health, social work -0.51 -2.09 2.59 3.05 6.13 8.14
other services 6.49 4.35 2.37 -0.22 4.23 14.87
private sector 15.69 16.28 5.53 -1.25 25.13 17.55
place ofresidence
100,000 inhabitants or -20.05 -0.50 13.42 13.46 27.27 10.96
more
20,000 to 99,999 -1.95 11.93 2.40 3.41 19.89 13.58
19,999 Of less 12.69 4.00 -0.52 -0.46 12.67 16.37
rural 9.31 -15.43 -15.30 -16.41 40.18 10.08
voivodship OR 1,6.65 15.63 13.96 14.07 14.25 -
# individuals 485 198 848 1,721 32,331 011.78
Notes: (1) ~ean denotes the percentage difference of the mean value of the category dummy
(category share in the sample) between people who are or were in, say, works and all people in the
sample. This means that if ~ean is positive (negative), the corresponding category is over-
(under-) represented in works programmes.
(2) The average unemployment rate (OR) with 11.78% is so low because ofthe exclusion ofthose
persons who have never been employed. If we include these persons, the average unemployment
rate would become 14.50%.
Source: Polish Labour Force Survey, own calculations.
41TableA3: Relative Odds Ratios for Categories Affected by Interaction Effects in Table 5
Category Unemployed Not Participating
age (between 36and45)
26 and 35




Notes: (I) To give an example. for female. the ROR is approximately eat.: xePxe'lS, where e~ is
the ROR for female in Table 5, ea is the ROR for (26 and 35) &female, A is the sample share of
the category (26 and 35) &female. eY is the ROR forfemale & single and S is the sample share of
the category single.
(2) Shaded RORs are significant at the 5% level.
TableA4: Relative Odds Ratiosfor Categories Affected by Interaction Effects in Table 6




age (between 36 and45)
26 and 35 1.46
(26 and 35) & female 1.00
female 0.98
female & single 1.31
single 1.16
Notes: (I) see Table A3.
(2) Shaded (asterisked (*» RORs are significant at the 5% (10%) level.
42Table AS: Effects for Categories Affected by Interaction Effects in Table 8
Category
age (between 36and 45)
26 and 35














female & single 0.28'
single 0.14'
Note: To give an example, for female, the effect is approximately aX+ ~+yS. where ~ is the co-
efficient for female in Table 5, a is the coefficient for (26 and 35) &female, X is the sample share
ofthe category (26 and 35) & female, y is the coefficient for female & single and S is the sample
share ofthe·category single.
Table A6: Relative Odds Ratios for Categories Affected by Interaction Effects in Table 10
Category Unemployed Not Participating
age (between 36and45)
26 and 35




Notes: see Table A3.
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